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Abstract 
This paper reviews the literature on the social impacts of programmable manufacturing tech- 
nology (PMT). Several perspectives on the social impact of technology are identified ranging 
from simple additive models that view technology as having a set of individual and independent 
causal impacts to a contingency perspective which views the impact of technology as dependent 
on technical and organizational characteristics. The paper statistically summarizes 30 empirical 
studies within the 1986-1990 period and finds common trends in findings as well as contradictory 
evidence. The common trends are that PMT tends to lead to more organic organizations, but also 
meets with negative employee attitudes, stress, and perceptions of reduced job security and mo- 
bility. The contradictory evidence is that most studies report simple, additive effects, while a 
substantial portion find that the impacts depend on a wide range of contingency variables. The 
authors argue that simplistic views of PMT as being a homogeneous set of technologies with uni- 
directional, non-contingent social impacts is neither realistic nor useful. A number of future re- 
search directions in this area are suggested. 
Keywords. Social impacts of technology; Programmable automation; CAD/CAM; Manufactur- 
ing; Sociotechnical systems; Organizational design 
1. Introduction 
The microelectronics revolution in manufacturing automation gives rise to 
varied images of its “social impact” depending on one’s academic paradigm, 
political perspective, occupational position, and personal philosophy. To some, 
the impact is clearly favorable for the workforce and society-automation will 
not only help the bottom line, but also lead to jobs that are more enriched and 
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challenging (Walton and Susman, 1987). Thus, the issue is to upgrade the skill 
levels of the workforce so they may take advantage, economically and person- 
ally, of the potential benefits offered by technology (Adler and Howard, 1990). 
To others, the computer revolution seems principally to be a threat to the job 
security of America’s hourly workforce, particularly the unskilled. Jobs will be 
lost, those remaining degraded, and managers will have almost complete con- 
trol of the workforce through sophisticated electronic monitoring in a kind of 
Orwellian nightmare (Baldry and Connolly, 1986; Gill, 1985; Cooley, 1981) . A 
third view is that programmable automation has varied impacts, depending on 
such factors as management’s foresight in redesigning jobs appropriately 
(Majchrzak, 1988; Adler, 1986)) the existing skill level of the work force (Bar- 
ley, 1986)) characteristics of firms leading to “organizational inertia”, (Dean 
and Snell, 1991), and political motivations of management and technology 
implementers (Shaiken, 1985; Thomas, 1993). 
The first two views assume that technology has main effects only-there are 
certain predominate consequences for organizations adopting PMT (e.g., skill 
levels will be raised) with a few exceptions due to random variation. The third 
view assumes that technology has contingent impacts-consequences vary de- 
pending on a set of contextual factors. Note that a contingency model does not 
imply that on average PMT’s positive and negative impacts of technology can- 
cel out. For example, it is possible that companies primarily use PMT to achieve 
more flexible production and thus on average PMT has the effect of making 
organizations more organic, but depending on the product mix flexibility re- 
quired by the market, manufacturing operations facing rapidly changing de- 
mand will shift to more highly organic forms than those with more stable, 
predictable demand.l 
This paper reviews recent literature on the social impacts of programmable 
manufacturing technology (PMT). By this we mean programmable technol- 
ogy within manufacturing firms, on their shopfloor or in their offices. We were 
intentionally quite broad in our definition of PMT. The technology had to be 
based on a programmable computer system and installed in a manufacturing 
firm. We included within this broad definition programmable shopfloor auto- 
mation such as numerically controlled machine tools and robots, computer- 
aided design systems used in the engineering offices, manufacturing resource 
planning (MRPII ) systems used for shopfloor control, and electronic data ex- 
change technologies. In fact, when we searched for studies of such technologies 
in manufacturing environments, we ended up primarily with studies that in- 
cluded shopfloor automation like NC machines in their focus (80 percent) 
‘Burns and Stalker (1961) described environment-organization combinations that range from 
highly uncertain-organic to highly certain-mechanistic. Thus it is not inconsistent to assume one 
can find environments that vary in the degree of uncertainty and corresponding organizations 
vary in the degree to which they are organic. 
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with a smaller proportion that looked at CAD or CAD/CAM systems (27 
percent). 
This paper has two purposes. First, we review recent empirical literature on 
social impacts of PMT to identify major trends in research findings, particu- 
larly with respect to evidence of main effects and contingent impacts. In par- 
ticular, we statistically summarize empirical papers on the social impacts of 
PMT, published and unpublished, between 1986 and 1990. These papers focus 
principally on the impacts of technology internal to the firm, that is, micro- 
implications for the organization and people in the firm. However, these inter- 
nal impacts ultimately have societal impacts as well, such as when a company’s 
upgrading of skill requirements for its workforce leads to a greater need for 
education from society. Second, we critically evaluate the existing literature 
and suggest future research directions. 
2. Importance of studying social impacts of PMT 
Why study the social impacts of PMT? There are at least three compelling 
reasons: 
First, if the social impacts of technology are perceived as “harmful” by the 
workforce, the workforce is likely to resist the introduction of new technology. 
Resistance can take the form of employee turnover, absenteeism, and even 
sabotage through deliberate damage to equipment or unwillingness to contrib- 
ute proactively to problem solving. For example, at Westinghouse a Fanuc ro- 
bot was designed to user specifications but never used. A case study of the failed 
installation revealed the following sequence of events (Knight, 1985 ). A proj- 
ect team began design of the robot at the request of upper-level manufacturing 
managers. Shopfloor supervisors were not consulted during the design work. 
When the robot arrived, several technical problems needed to be worked out 
during production runs, but shopfloor personnel helped as little as possible and 
essentially circumvented the efforts of the project team staff. A study by the 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment concluded: “The main stum- 
bling blocks in the near future for implementation of programmable automa- 
tion technology are not technical, but rather are barriers of cost, organization 
of the factory, availability of appropriate skills, and social effects of the tech- 
nologies”. (Office of Technology Assessment, 1984, p. 94; italics added). 
A second reason is that part of planning the process of implementing new 
technology is the ability to anticipate and manage its “social impacts” (Bridges, 
1991). Without awareness of these issues we are likely to continue to see tech- 
nologies that are good ideas on paper remain on the shelf. The Manufacturing 
Studies Board of the National Research Council conducted a study of 24 cases 
of the implementation of CAM and CIM technologies and concluded: “Real- 
izing the full benefits of these technologies will require systematic change in 
the management of people and machines, including planning, plant culture, 
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plant organization, job design, compensation, selection and training, and la- 
bor-management relations” (Manufacturing Studies Board, 1986, p. 2 ) . 
A third reason takes a longer-term view. Studying the social impacts of pro- 
grammable manufacturing technologies in micro-settings provides insights into 
broader historical social trends. It seems self-evident that the rapid introduc- 
tion of micro-processors is contributing to fundamental changes in the work- 
place and the nature of work. Work in the 21st century is apt to be quite dif- 
ferent from work in the 20th century. We are in a period of transition and 
studying the process of change is useful for historical documentation purposes 
as well as to help us predict and influence future societal trends. 
3. “Main effects only” models versus contingent social impacts 
The notion of uniform social impacts of technology typically implies a sim- 
ple causal relationship: technology is implemented and a set of direct impacts 
follow. This view is sometimes referred to as the technological imperative per- 
spective which “views technology as an exogenous force which determines or 
strongly constrains the behavior of individuals and organization” (Markus 
and Robey, 1988, p. 585). 
In fact, there are strong theoretical reasons for believing that the predomi- 
nant impacts of PMT will be to encourage more organic organizations char- 
acterized by broader, more flexible roles, greater multi-way communication, 
fewer rigid standard operating procedures, and the like. For example, building 
on the research stream launched by Joan Woodward’s (1965) classic study of 
three types of manufacturing systems, researchers have recently provided evi- 
dence that there is a “fourth type”-high-technology batch production-which 
is based on the flexibility offered by programmable automation (Hull and Col- 
lins, 1987). In keeping with Woodward’s technological imperative paradigm 
the suggestion is that, as we move to programmable automation, there is a 
particular best way to organize-in this case to more flexible, organic organi- 
zations. Programmable automation enables firms to economically make small 
lots of customized products reaping some of the cost advantages previously 
possible only in mass production systems and the flexibility of small-batch 
customized production. But to capitalize on this flexibility, firms must have 
flexible, i.e., organic, organizations. While it is possible for firms to use pro- 
grammable automation strictly to automate mass-production single-product 
lines, they will get limited benefits from the programmability and may incur 
higher costs for the technology. The observation that effective use of PMT 
requires more organic organizations was strongly echoed in the NRC case stud- 
ies, as summarized by Walton and Susman ( 1987 ) . They argued, based on their 
observations of plants using PMT, that the most effective industrial plants 
that implemented programmable automation had “people policies” that em- 
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phasize teamwork, training, employee involvement, flat management hierar- 
chies, and the like. 
Nonetheless, when we look at the various case studies of technological change 
in the literature, the technological deterministic perspective appears too sim- 
plistic to account for the varied effects of technology across cases (Majchrzak 
and Salzman, 1989; Crowston and Malone, 1988). For example, research on 
the effects of computerized technology on skill levels finds that skill upgrading 
or deskilling has less to do with the technology per se than it does with man- 
agement discretion in designing jobs around the technology (Adler, 1986; Shai- 
ken, 1985). It is precisely this variation that would be expected and accounted 
for by a contingent-impacts perspective. 
If we think about main effects in graphical form, plotting social impacts on 
the Y-axis and looking at the trend on the X-axis as we move from before PMT 
to after PMT we can think of three scenarios. What we will call in this paper 
a positive slope would mean a net upgrade in the jobs and quality of worklife. 
For example, if the “impact” of technology is to create more jobs, we would 
expect a positive slope from before PMT to after PMT. We would classify as a 
negative slope a scenario where the predominate consequence of PMT is to 
eliminate jobs. A finding of no main effects would be represented as a zero 
slope, e.g., the effect of PMT is no net gain or loss of jobs. Note that there will 
be variation around the central tendencies in each of these cases. For example, 
if the unit of analysis is the manufacturing plant, one might find that each 
plant has a different trend, but the average trend is either positive, negative, 
or no main effects. 
The main-effects model can be represented by a simple additive model in 
which the implementation of technology is the independent variable and meas- 
ures of social impacts are the dependent variables. Any variation not explained 
by the technology variable is represented either as systematic effects of control 
variables or random variation reflected in an error term. In the case of a finding 
of no main effects, one would conclude that PMT does not effect organizational 
variables. What is not considered under this model is that programmable au- 
tomation might have systematically different consequences for subsets of the 
cases for the same social impact measure (e.g., some cases may experience 
raised skill levels while other cases may experience lowered skill). 
As discussed earlier, equations for contingent impacts can take varying forms 
ranging from zero average effects to positive or negative average effects. One 
scenario is that under two different conditions the technology has different 
degrees of positive impacts. For example, Barley (1986) studied the same CT 
scanner technology introduced into two hospitals. In both cases, the tradi- 
tional social distance between radiologists and lower-status radiological tech- 
nicians was reduced, but it was reduced to a much greater degree in one hospital 
compared to the other. The difference seemed to be due to the initial skill levels 
of technicians-the traditional, hierarchical authority relationship was re- 
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duced by the technology to a greater extent when technicians were already 
highly skilled radiologists prior to the introduction of the technology, as com- 
pared to when the technicians were relative novices. 
A second case is when the impacts of the technology are negative under two 
conditions, but to a different degree. For example, two companies might ex- 
perience job losses as a result of implementing PMT, but the percent of the 
workforce laid off could be lower in one plant that had relatively lean staffing 
to begin with. A third example is the most dramatic, showing mixed positive 
and negative slopes. In this case, the technology has a positive effect under one 
condition, but a negative effect under a second condition. For example, Shai- 
ken (1985) observes cases in which programmable automation raises skill lev- 
els when NC programming is assigned to machinists and others where skill 
levels are reduced when NC programming is assigned to specialist program- 
mers. He argues that this is the result of management discretion in designing 
jobs. What is interesting about the third example is that a pure main-effects 
model would find no impact of technology, whereas, by formulating the model 
based on the proper contingency formulation we find that there are positive 
impacts which on average cancel out negative impacts. 
In this paper we will use the term “mixed impacts” to refer to findings that 
the impact of technology varies with some specifiable contingency variable. 
Thus, we would refer to all three of the examples given here as mixed-impact 
models. 
A contingency model does not necessarily imply that technology has a me- 
chanistic impact that will always vary in predictable ways under different cir- 
cumstances such as the impact of a billiard ball under different gravitational 
forces. In fact, there would undoubtedly be individual cases that vary around 
each of the slopes. The goal is not to explain 100 percent of the variance. There 
is a danger in viewing technology as contingent on so many variables so that 
each and every case of technology introduction would be completely unique. In 
this case there would be no point in speaking of any systematic “impacts” of 
technology whatsoever. 
Barley (1986) has attempted to reconcile interactionist perspectives on 
technology, which suggest highly particularistic impacts of technology, with 
structural perspectives, which assume systematic effects, through the use of 
Gidden’s (1979) concept of structuration. Barley (1986) argues that technol- 
ogy presents “an occasion for structuring”. Structure in this sense is viewed as 
a process rather than a static configuration; technology is viewed as having a 
reality which can bring about patterned social interaction. So, for example, 
when he observes that the introduction of CT scanners into radiology depart- 
ments in two hospitals had similar effects on role relationships, but to different 
degrees, he argues that specific features of the technology brought about new 
patterns of role interaction, albeit to different degrees in different social con- 
texts. As another example, Majchrzak (1991) views technology as delimiting 
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organizational choices. Majchrzak (1991, p. 6) argues that “certain identifia- 
ble changes in organizational and human factors (such as tasks that need to 
be performed) can be directly attributable to technology”. Based on an open- 
systems model she argues that certain organizational and job designs will tit 
with certain technology attributes, contingent upon the environment and stra- 
tegic goals of management. This perspective does not assume that all managers 
will be aware of the need to change their organization to utilize the capabilities 
of new technologies, but that certain combinations of organization and tech- 
nology will be more effective than others. 
Majchrzak (1991) argues that technology does not cause organizational 
change, but rather particular features of technology delimit the range of effec- 
tive organizational design choices in three different ways. The technology may 
require organizational changes for the technology to be used effectively (e.g., 
to prevent downtime), the technology may create new opportunities for orga- 
nizational design such as new patterns of work (e.g., create opportunities for 
self-managing teams rather than purely sequential interdependence), and 
technology may eliminate certain design options (e.g., self-managing teams 
may become impossible when the technology creates sequentially interdepen- 
dent work and workers are spaced far apart). 
For example, one might imagine a scenario in which the use of CAD/CAM 
provides a stimulant to greater social interaction between product designers 
and manufacturing. Users of the technology quickly discover that in order to 
effectively prepare and translate the product data so they are useful for man- 
ufacturing purposes, design and manufacturing must arrive at a set of agree- 
ments and must communicate about the transfer of data. Thus, while imple- 
mentors of the technology may not envision greater social interaction when 
they introduce the technology, to make the technology work may require such 
communication, in effect delimiting their social choices. In fact, Adler and 
Helleloid (1987) speculate, contrary to this hypothetical example, that effec- 
tive CAD/CAM use requires social integration between design and manufac- 
turing prior to implementation of the technology (ex ante), and attempts to 
use CAD/CAM to facilitate organizational integration (ex post) will be 
unsuccessful. 
Open-systems theorists have long argued for a contingency perspective. For 
example, Nadler and Tushman (1980) argue that effective organizations must 
find a fit between their core tasks/technology, formal organizational arrange- 
ments, informal organization, employee characteristics, and the external en- 
vironment of the firm. Socio-technical systems (STS) theory, which is based 
on open-systems theory, focuses particular attention on the social system- 
technical system fit (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Emery and Trist, 1978; Pas- 
more, 1988). They argue that joint optimization of the social and technical 
system will bring better results than optimizing either the social or technical 
system alone (Taylor and Asadorian, 1985). 
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STS and organizational design theorists emphasize in particular the need 
for a fit between the external environment of the firm and the internal orga- 
nizational design (Emery and Trist, 1965; Pasmore, 1988). For example, Burns 
and Stalker (1961) compared different industries whose environments ranged 
from highly stable to highly dynamic and found that more “organic” forms of 
organization were most effective when the environment is dynamic and more 
mechanistic organizations were most effective when the environment is stable. 
However, they have less to say about the social system characteristics which 
“fit” with different types of technology within the same industry facing a sim- 
ilar environment. A seminal formulation by Perrow (1967) suggests that when 
the technology is less routine (i.e., there are greater number of exceptions as 
hardware and software systems break down in unpredictable ways), more or- 
ganic organization structures will be more effective, while more routine tech- 
nologies fit with more mechanistic organizational designs. Despite the power 
of this formulation, there are clearly more ways to characterize technology and 
its context of use than technological uncertainty. 
Like Majchrzak’s (1991) formulation, the STS theorists seem to view tech- 
nology as delimiting choices associated with organizational effectiveness. There 
is no law of nature driving managers to find the right fit between the technol- 
ogy and organization. In fact many seem to fail to understand the social system 
implications of technology (Majchrzak, 1988). Nonetheless, if a substantial 
number of managers understand the fit issue, one would expect to see pat- 
terned “impacts” of technology. However, the impact of technology will vary 
with a whole host of conditions that effect the fit between technology and or- 
ganization (e.g., the external environment). 
In sum, there appears to be general consensus in more recent theoretical 
formulations that assumptions of purely additive “impacts” of technology, as 
represented by main-effects models, are overly simplistic (Barley, 1986; 
Majchrzak, 1991; Kling and Scacchi, 1982; Markus and Robey, 1988). Yet, as 
we will see when we look at the existing literature, a surprising number of 
recent studies fail to even consider contingent relations. 
4. Research propositions 
We began with some a priori expectations about what the literature would 
reveal. We present these in the form of propositions to help frame the literature 
review. The first two propositions have to do with average trends across stud- 
ies, i.e., main effects, while the second two are contingency propositions. We 
anticipated that there would be different average impacts of technology de- 
pending on whether we focused on organizational structure and processes or 
individual reactions. A summary of the social impact variables we examined is 
provided in Table 1. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































job and organizational design, skill requirements, communications, and em- 
ployee involvement in decision making. The OTA report ( 1984 ) and National 
Research Council (NRC ) studies (Manufacturing Studies Board, 1986 ) argue 
that new technology requires more organic organizational forms that include 
broader, more flexible job definitions, higher-level cognitive skill require- 
ments, more open two-way communication across levels and across functions, 
and employee involvement in day-to-day decisions. This is also consistent with 
common STS interventions. While these interventions aim to achieve a fit 
between the environment, technical systems, and social systems, there is a 
remarkable consistency in the actual organizational solutions proposed. These 
solutions generally include the use of semi-autonomous work groups and an 
attempt to create an organic organizational environment (Emery and Trist, 
1978; Pasmore, 1988; Taylor and Asadorian, 1985). 
The basic argument is that programmable automation is effective at auto- 
mating repetitive, manual tasks, but does not completely control itself. In part 
because the technologies are new and unproven, and in part because of their 
complexity, these technologies often fail in unpredictable ways. In Weick’s 
(1990) terms, programmable manufacturing technologies are high on “equi- 
voque”. The result is that humans need to be an integral part of the deviation 
detection and correction loop. They need to monitor the technology, respond 
quickly to failures, and learn how the technology fails and ideally how to im- 
prove the technology. This requires initiative and autonomy that goes far be- 
yond the repetitive, manual work characteristic of the age of scientific man- 
agement. Thus, it is theorized that to effectively exploit PMT, organizations 
must be organic, providing workers with extensive training, timely and accu- 
rate information, autonomy, flexible jobs that allow workers to flexibly adapt 
to the situation, and involvement in technological improvement decisions. The 
proposition that derives from this is: 
Proposition 1. Most studies will look only for main effects and report that 
programmable automation is associated with more organic 
organizations. 
Given the prevailing reasoning about the impact of PMT, it should not be 
surprising that researchers will generally expect to find more organic organi- 
zations. However, why should they find that PMT is associated with more 
organic organizations? If, in fact, the world is such that a contingency model 
is a best fit, one might presume that researchers who fail to consider these 
contingencies will consistently find no effects of technology-positive and neg- 
ative effects should cancel out. However, as discussed earlier, a contingency 
model does not mean that there are counterbalancing positive and negative 
effects. As examplified by Barley’s (1986) study discussed earlier, it is possible 
to find that a technology leads to reduced social distance in general, but to 
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different degrees under different conditions. Someone not recognizing the con- 
tingency would find a positive main effect which was the average of Barley’s 
two different positive slopes. Moreover, a researcher may be capturing in their 
sample only a limited range on the contingency variable. For example, if the 
existence of a strong union prevented companies from laying off workers when 
they introduced PMT but researchers only studied non-unionized companies, 
they may find large numbers of jobs lost as a result of PMT despite the fact 
that, on average, across unionized and non-unionized companies the impacts 
are much less profound. As discussed in the next section, most of the studies 
of PMT impacts focused on quite small samples of manufacturing firms and 
often on a single plant so they were not likely to capture a range of the different 
cells in a contingency model. 
If the organization adopting PMT, on average, becomes more organic and 
workers have more “enriched” jobs, does this mean workers will be happy? 
The answer is not necessarily affirmative. In a case study of the implementa- 
tion of programmable automation in a small manufacturing firm, the first au- 
thor and associates found general trends toward a more organic organization, 
but very mixed employee reactions depending on their position in the company 
(Liker et al., 1987). Employees who had jobs that were central to the function- 
ing of the new programmable automation were generally enthusiastic about 
the new technology and the changes to their jobs. However, many long-time 
employees who worked on old equipment that was being phased out feared they 
would ultimately lose their jobs. Interestingly, employees selected to work with 
the new automation seemed excited but also reported more work-related stress 
than employees working on the old equipment. It seems that dealing with the 
project delays, uncertainty, and pressures of installing the new equipment led 
to long work hours and a stressful work environment. Thus, we see mixed 
results of the technology on individuals, depending on their work role, and 
some individuals had mixed reactions, enthusiasm tempered by stress. This 
leads to the second proposition: 
Propositon 2. Individual reactions to programmable automation will be mixed, 
with neither positive nor negative reactions predominating. 
The first two propositions focus on central tendencies, but we also expected 
considerable variation in the findings of studies. As discussed at the beginning 
of this article, one can find papers that report a very positive scenario of or- 
ganic, open systems with enriched challenging jobs, those that report a nega- 
tive scenario of degraded jobs and massive layoffs, and still others that identify 
mixed positive and negative results that can be explained by contingency vari- 
ables that condition the impacts of technology. 
We suspected that these differences in findings are partly attributable to the 
types of research methods used and the quality of the studies. For example, 
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qualitative case studies might lead to different general findings than large- 
sample surveys and peer-reviewed articles might have generally different find- 
ings than papers that have not undergone the scrutiny of the peer-review pro- 
cess. We attempted to develop specific propositions about the effects of various 
study characteristics, but this led to too many individual propositions to list 
here, as well as some contradictory propositions. For example, one can argue 
that qualitative case studies are more likely to lead to findings of contingent 
impacts as the researcher is confronted with all of the rich complexity of tech- 
nology implementation, or one can argue that large-scale surveys are more 
likely to find contingent impacts as the larger sample provides more cross-site 
variation to analyze. Rather than attempt to precisely define the numerous 
possible propositions, we use the following summary proposition: 
Proposition 3. The social impact of programmable automation varies sys- 
tematically with the research method employed to study it. 
We also expected that the theoretical framework of the researcher(s) would 
influence what they saw. In particular, we were interested in the difference 
between studies that reported main effects only and those that reported mixed 
impacts, e.g., varying slopes. We suspected that this depended on whether the 
author started out with a main-effects-only model or a contingency model as 
reflected in Proposition 4. That is, by failing to think in terms of contingencies, 
some authors will report only the average impact and interpret these as main 
effects. In this sense, what the researcher sees is influenced by what the re- 
searcher looks for. 
Proposition 4. Researchers who propose a main-effects-only model will tend 
to report only main effects, whereas researchers who propose 
a contingency formulation will tend to report mixed impacts. 
We turn now to the methods we used for identifying and classifying the thirty 
studies. We then present the study results which test our four propositions. 
5. Research design and measures 
5.1. Selection of studies 
There already are reviews of social impact studies prior to 1986 (Majchrzak, 
1988). Therefore, we focused our review on post-1986 studies. Based on data- 
base searches, conference proceedings, and personal contacts of the authors, 
we attempted to identify all studies of the social impacts of programmable 
automation in manufacturing that met the following conditions: 
(1) empirical studies of actual organizations which implemented new pro- 
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grammable automation (e.g., we excluded articles written from the expe- 
riences of managers who did not actually conduct a study of some kind); 
(2 ) data collected in manufacturing sites, office or shopfloor; 
(3) programmable automation as an independent variable; 
(4) organizational or individual characteristics as dependent variables; 
(5 ) all studies had proposed some impact of technology and empirically tested 
their hypotheses; 
(6) papers written or published from 1986 to the time we collected the studies 
in 1990. 
Based on these criteria we identified 30 separate studies (see Appendix for 
complete citations). We cannot say whether we actually captured the universe 
of studies that met our criteria. However, we did not systematically omit any 
particular kinds of studies. 
5.2. Coding method 
Each study was summarized in several page documents by research assist- 
ants using a consistent format which described the technologies studied, in- 
dependent variables, dependent variables, research methods used, a dia- 
grammed version of the model presented or implied, and study findings. Based 
on these summaries, a final coding was performed. Two of the authors inde- 
pendently coded the studies and differences in coding were resolved through 
discussion and between the researchers. Interrater reliability was assessed as 
discussed in the next section. 
Coding social impacts 
All four propositions treat social impact measures as dependent variables. 
In Propositions 1 and 2 we consider the overall trends in the social impact 
findings and Propositions 3 and 4 focus on differences in findings across studies. 
We first identified the social impacts to be examined and then coded the 
findings of the studies with respect to these social impacts. The categories of 
social impacts examined were determined inductively by identifying the most 
common impacts looked at in our sample of studies. For each variable, we then 
coded: (1) whether the studies examined the variable, and (2) whether they 
reported negative impacts, positive impacts, mixed positive and negative im- 
pacts, or no impact. 
A summary of the social impacts we examined is provided in Table 1. We 
distinguish in this table between impacts on organizational structures andpro- 
cesses (job design, skill requirements, communication, employee involvement, 
and organization structure) and impacts on individual reactive responses (at- 
titudes/stress, perceptions of job security/mobility). Based on the most prev- 
alent conception that programmable automation generally requires more or- 
ganic organizational forms, we coded impacts as positive if the technology led 
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to attributes associated with organic organizations, and negative if the tech- 
nology led to more mechanistic characteristics (Burns and Stalker, 1961). For 
individual impacts, we assumed that job satisfaction and perceptions of job 
security/mobility were positive, while job stress, dissatisfaction and percep- 
tions of job insecurity were negatiue. This is not to say that organic organiza- 
tions are always better than mechanistic organizations or even that job stress 
is always bad. However, on average, if the predominate tendency of PMT was 
to lead to routine, unchallenging, stressful jobs, this would typically be viewed 
as a negative trend. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the number of studies which examined each of the 
dependent variables varied. The large majority of studies considered impacts 
on job design and skill requirements (27 and 25 studies respectively), while 
only about one-third considered impacts on organizational structure, job se- 
curity, and business impacts (12,13, and 10 respectively). There were several 
social impacts that we wanted to investigate but could not because of their 
almost complete absence from the studies examined. For example, reward 
structures were considered by only five studies and impacts on external rela- 
tions with vendors and customers were considered in only two studies. We 
explain how we coded each of the social impact variables below, ordered from 
the most often examined impacts to the least often examined. 
Organizational impacts 
Job design. What happened to the jobs of individual workers? We considered 
changes in the job design dimensions in Hackman and Oldham’s job diagnostic 
model (Hackman and Oldham, 1980) as well as more general statements of 
the challenge or boredom associated with the job. If jobs were enriched after 
the technology was implemented, we coded this as positive, whereas more rou- 
tinized jobs were coded negative. 
Skill requirements. Were there changes in the level of skill requirements with 
the new technology? This was defined in different ways across studies and we 
used the authors’ definitions to code this variable. For example, if the authors 
concluded that skill levels were raised, we coded it that way. Generally if the 
workers had to learn new skills, such as computer programming, and used more 
cognitive skills as opposed to manual skills, this was coded as increased skill 
requirements. 
Communication. Was there a change in the amount of communication, verti- 
cally or horizontally? If there was evidence that managers communicated more 
with their workers after the change or listened to their workers more, or evi- 
dence of more cross-functional communication, or more communication within 
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a work group, we coded this as positive. If workers were more socially isolated 
after the change, we coded this as negative. 
Employee involvement. Were there changes in the degree of employee involve- 
ment in decision making? If the change was accompanied by more employee 
participation in decisions about their job or work context, we coded this as 
positive. If employees were given less responsibility for decision making, we 
coded this as negative. 
Organizational structure. Did the overall organization become more organically 
structured or mechanistically structured? For example, if the result was a flat- 
ter organization with loosely defined jobs and structures and flexible operating 
procedures, we coded this as positive. If more levels in the hierarchy were added, 
more rules were created, or the hierarchy was reinforced, we coded this as neg- 
ative. Use of data for externally monitoring and controlling workers would also 
be coded negative as it is characteristic of a mechanistic organization. 
Employee impacts 
Employee attitudes/stress. What were people’s attitudes toward the technology 
and accompanying changes? Did people say positive things about the technol- 
ogy or report a higher quality of work life when the new technology was intro- 
duced? Were they angry, threatened, dissatisfied? 
Perceived job security/mob&y. Did people perceive their job security or chances 
for job mobility as enhanced or diminished by PMT? 
Business impacts 
We looked at impacts on outcomes of the new technology on the functioning 
of the business. Were there increases or decreases in productivity, quality, sales, 
etc. as a result of the new technology? 
In most cases the coding was straightforward as researchers used terminol- 
ogy similar to ours. For example, most studies explicitly considered the impact 
of the technology on job design using such terms as task complexity, vertical 
job loading, and job enrichment. We computed the percent agreement between 
the two independent coders as shown in Table 1. On average, there was 75 
percent agreement across the social impact measures. Agreement meant that 
we assigned the case to the same one of the four possible categories. Thus, by 
chance we would expect only 25 percent agreement. Differences in coding were 
resolved through discussion between the coders. 
To test Proposition 3 we needed to code the social impact measures so they 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































coding these dependent variables and ran all analyses with all three sets of 
measures. What varied was the way we handled findings of mixed impacts. 
First, we used the complete set of four categories-negative impacts, positive 
impacts, no impacts, and mixed impacts-and used chi-square statistics to 
assess the relationship between these social impact variables and study char- 
acteristics. Second, we combined findings of “no impacts” and “mixed im- 
pacts” into a single category scored zero so that the resulting variable was 
either positive impacts ( + l), negative impacts ( - 1)) or mixed/no impacts 
(0). Our rationale for combining mixed with no impact is that both findings 
seem less clearly positive than positive main effects and less clearly negative 
than negative main effects. One can certainly argue against this rationale, so 
we used a third method. The third approach treated mixed-impact studies as 
missing values and used a three-point scale of negative ( - 1)) positive (1)) and 
no impact (0). We also computed the “average impact” for each study which 
was the average of all “social” impacts, excluding the business impacts. Fi- 
nally, we looked at the number of impacts examined in each study. 
To test Proposition 4 we needed to distinguish studies which reported main 
effects only from those which reported mixed impacts. We created a binary 
variable coding main effects only (positive, negative, or zero) as zero and mixed 
impact findings as one. 
5.3. Study characteristics 
In addition to social impacts, we recorded a number of study characteristics 
that can be viewed as moderator variables. That is, we asked whether the vari- 
ation in observed relationships between technology and social impacts could 
be explained by these study characteristics. The thirty studies and how each 
were classified are presented in Table 2. Descriptive statistics summarizing the 
thirty studies are presented in Table 3. We coded whether the study was pub- 
lished and if so whether this was in a peer-reviewed journal, the type of tech- 
nology studied (shopfloor automation, computer-aided design (CAD ) , or 
other), which of four research methods were used, whether formal statistical 
tests were used, and whether any contingency variables were considered. 
As shown in Table 3 only half of the studies we identified were in peer- 
reviewed journals. The great majority of studies examined shopfloor automa- 
tion (80 percent), most often some kind of numerically controlled (NC ) ma- 
chine tools, while 27 percent studied CAD, and 20 percent examined other 
technologies, including manufacturing resource planning, order processing, and 
other database systems. These categories are not mutually exclusive-some 
studies investigated CAD and NC machines for example. It is interesting to 
note that two of the studies did not even describe any specific technology. They 
asked employees in a survey about their attitudes toward “new computer tech- 
nology”, as if all technologies were alike. 
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TABLE 3 
Independent variables for meta-analysis 
Independent variables Description 
Published study? Peer-reviewed journal 
Book/book chapter 




Technology Shopfloor PMT 80% 
CAD 27% 
Other (e.g., word processing, business systems) 20% 
Research methods Qualitative case studies 
Opinion surveys (multiple sites) 







Contingency variable considered 
Significance test performed 
Model suggested contingent impacts 
20% 
40% 
The research methods used in these social impact studies were based pri- 
marily on case studies, mainly qualitative (37 percent), with some single-site 
quantitative cases, typically retrospective (27 percent). Another 33 percent of 
the studies were based on larger-sample cross-sectional surveys. The one con- 
trolled experiment (Johansson, 1989) created a simulated situation to com- 
pare whether active or passive monitoring of the technology by workers was 
more stressful. 
The majority of studies were based on a single site (24 percent) or 2-4 cases 
(48 percent) and even employee reactions were often based on interviews with 
a small number of people. Only 20 percent of the studies used any statistical 
tests of significance. 
We coded whether the studies considered a contingency variable based on 
the theoretical models explicitly stated or implied in the papers. That is, we 
looked for some suggestion in the researchers’ theoretical formulations that 
the impacts of technology might vary under different conditions. Only 40 per- 
cent of the studies made any mention of contingency variables-most studies 
assumed only main effects. 
5.4. Analysis methods 
To address Propositions 1 and 2, we examined the univariate distributions 
of “social impact” measures. We then examined bivariate relationships be- 
tween each of the social impact measures and the study characteristics. As 
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described earlier we tried three different coding methods for the social impact 
variables. We used chi-square statistics to test relationships with the four- 
category measures-positive, negative, zero, mixed. We used one-way ANOVA 
when we collapsed these into three ordinal categories-positive (1)) negative 
( -l), zero/mixed (0). Finally, we used chi-square statistics to examine the 
relationship between findings of main-effects-only versus mixed-impacts and 
the study characteristics. 
We considered more complex analysis techniques. Salipante et al. (1982) 
suggest coding the actual effect size, but this was not possible in our case since 
we had a combination of qualitative and quantitative studies and most studies 
did not report formal measures of association. Multivariate analysis would also 
have been desirable. However, since most studies only examined a few of the 
social impact variables, the sample size for particular impacts was too low (e.g., 
nine cases for business impacts). 
6. Results 
6.1. Overall distribution of social impact findings 
The overall distribution of findings for the 30 studies are presented in Table 
4. As Proposition 1 predicts, among those studies that reported only main ef- 
TABLE 4 
Findings on social impacts of technology, 1986-1990 
Percent of those that examined variable finding 
Social impacts 
% Considered Negative No main Positive Mixed 

















50% 33 0 13 








“Mixed impact means the study identified both positive and negative impacts for the particular 
variable (e.g., some increased skill level and some skill degradation). It does not necessarily mean 
the interaction effect was statistically tested. 
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fects, the majority found positive impacts on organizational structure and pro- 
cesses. That is, as a result of implementing programmable automation, on av- 
erage, jobs were more enriched, skill requirements were higher, communication 
channels were more open, employees were more involved in decision-making 
related to their jobs, and the overall organization was more organic. On aver- 
age, across these five measures of organizational impacts, 60 percent of the 
studies reported positive impacts whereas only 5 percent reported negative 
impacts (with the remaining 29 percent of studies reporting mixed organiza- 
tional impacts). 
As Proposition 2 predicts, the impacts of the technology on individual atti- 
tudes/stress and job security/mobility were more mixed. However, we did not 
anticipate the preponderance of negative effects. For individual attitudes/stress, 
out of the 46 percent of studies that reported only main effects, 72 percent of 
these found negative impacts. On the other hand, in support of Proposition 2, 
the majority of studies found mixed impacts on attitudes/stress. For perceived 
job security/mobility, 70% of the studies that reported only main effects found 
negative effects. A smaller percent of studies (17 percent) found mixed results 
for this variable. 
Finally, business impacts were studied in only 10 cases. Most studies re- 
ported positive effects (67 percent) and the rest reported mixed positive and 
negative effects. 
6.2. Social impacts related to study characteristics 
Since there was some variation in findings between studies, an interesting 
question is: What was the source of that variation? Why did some studies find 
positive impacts while others found negative impacts? Why did some studies 
report only main effects while others reported mixed impacts? 
Proposition 3 suggested that social impact findings systematically varied 
with the research methods employed. To address this proposition, we first used 
the dependent variables as described in Table 1 and examined their bivariate 
relationship to each of the study characteristics in Table 2 using both ANOVA 
and contingency table approaches. Recall that three different formulations of 
the social impact variables were tried that treated the mixed impacts in differ- 
ent ways. 
Despite all of the different bivariate relationships examined, the vast major- 
ity of these relationships were not significantly different from zero. That is, 
the proposition was not supported by the data. We tried the three different 
codings of dependent variables. We tried various ways of coding the indepen- 
dent variables. For example, we compared peer-reviewed publications to all 
others, then we compared peer-reviewed publications to book chapters to pro- 
ceedings/unpublished papers. We compared shopfloor automation to all oth- 
ers, as well as shopfloor automation, to CAD only, to other technologies only. 
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We compared qualitative studies to all others, surveys to all others, and case 
studies (qualitative/quantitative) to all others. The results were that very few 
coefficients were significant, even at a liberal 0.10 level. 
There were a few exceptions where significance levels of 0.05 were achieved 
or nearly achieved. First, sample surveys compared to other methods predicted 
impacts on attitudes/stress (p = 0.01) and security/mobility impacts (p = 0.07 ) . 
It seemed that surveys found positive impacts on employee attitudes (mean 
impact = 0.4)) whereas other methods (mostly case studies) showed negative 
impacts (mean impact = -0.5). Second, shopfloor automation compared to 
CAD/other technologies was associated with more positive attitudes on aver- 
age (means=0 vs - 0.75; p= 0.05)) and less perceived loss of job security/ 
mobility (means = -0.1 vs - 1.0; ~~0.07). Third, the use of formal signifi- 
cance tests compared to no statistical tests was associated with less positive 
effects on job design (means=0 vs 0.6; p= 0.05). Finally, peer-reviewed arti- 
cles (versus others) was associated with less negative perceived job security/ 
mobility effects (means = 0 vs - 0.83; p = 0.06). 
Overall, these results suggest the impacts reported were quite robust with 
respect to the study methods, technologies, and publication outlet. There is a 
danger that the few exceptions where relationships were found resulted from 
Type 1 error. We ran many statistical tests and the sample size is quite small. 
For example, there were only ten cases that considered employment effects 
and thirteen cases that considered attitudes/stress. The independent variables 
were also highly skewed. For example, of the thirteen cases that looked at at- 
titudes/stress, only three of these did not involve shopfloor automation. 
Therefore, contrary findings in even two non-shopfloor automation cases can 
have a serious impact on the observed relationship between type of technology 
and attitudes/stress. 
6.3. Mixed versus main-effects-only findings and study characteristics 
While most of the studies reported only main effects, a large minority re- 
ported mixed results. Thus, we compared mixed versus main-effect results for 
each social impact measure for each of the study characteristics in Table 2. 
The two study characteristics that were significantly related to mixed versus 
main effects were whether formal significance tests were reported and whether 
the study explicitly considered contingency variables. 
Studies that used statistical tests were more likely to report mixed impacts. 
In all, 60 percent of the six studies that used statistical tests found mixed re- 
sults on job design versus 19 percent of studies that did not use these tests 
(p ~0.06). Similarly, 60 percent of studies with significance tests found mixed 
impacts on skills compared to 21 percent of other studies (p = 0.08). The dif- 
ferences for other social impact measures were mixed and none was even near 
statistical significance. 
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A more straightforward pattern of results is shown in Table 5. We looked at 
studies that considered contingency effects versus those where the theoretical 
model (explicit or implicit) assumed only main effects and found a strong 
relationship to findings of mixed versus main-effects-only results. In fact, re- 
searchers who did not consider contingency formulations in their model never 
reported mixed organization impacts. 
This suggests that the research findings depended on the theoretical for- 
mulation. Researchers who looked for contingency variables reported contin- 
gent effects, whereas those who considered only main effects in their model 
found only main effects. One might argue that causality goes the other way. 
Researchers who found mixed results that they could tie to a contingency vari- 
able formulated a contingency model. The consequence is still that the result 
reported covaried with the theoretical model. 
6.4. Overview of contingent impacts 
We looked more closely at the twelve studies that considered contingent 
impacts and summarize their findings in Table 6. What is most striking is that 
each of the twelve studies conceptualized the contingency variables in different 
ways and reached different conclusions about what matters. We were able to 
TABLE 5 










Percent found mixed results 
No contingency Contingency 
variable in the variable in the 
model model 
p-value” Number of 
studies 
0% 73% 0.0001 27 
0% 70% 0.0002 25 
0% 57% 0.009 17 
0% 60% 0.01 13 
0% 67% 0.02 12 




33% 63% 0.06 15 
13% 25% .58 13 
Mixed business impacts 
“Based on Chi-square tests. 
33% 33% 1.0 10 
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TABLE 6 
Summary of contingent impacts identified (12 studies) 
Study Contingency variable Findings 
Gheissari and Fiegener (1989) Worker skill level” 
Liker et al. (1987) 
Aronsson (1989) 
Kemp and Mueller (1987) 
Johansson (1989) 
Adler (1990) Product complexityb 
Kelley (1986) 
Martensson (1986) 





Task allocation between 
machine and workerr’ 
Production volumeb 
Plant size, union, skill 
base, management style’ 
Management approach 
and job design’ 
Skilled workers (e.g., machinists, trades) had 
higher skill levels/enriched jobs but unskilled 
workers found jobs/skills degraded by new 
technology. 
Workers whose jobs were automated reported 
mostly positive changes, whereas those whose 
jobs might be eliminated by new technology 
reported mostly negative changes. 
Low level = more stress, less social cohesion; 
Middle level = more stress (but less than 
lowest), no change in cohesion; Upper 
level = no social impacts of computer 
technology. 
CNC implementation increased skill levels but 
automation that indicated with lights the 
position of work reduced skill levels. 
Tasks designed for active involvement of 
worker led to higher satisfaction, fun, 
confidence compared to more automated tasks 
with less worker activity. 
More complex products reinforce skill 
upgrading (especially in design) 
Higher production volumes make downtime 
expensive and reinforce skill upgrading. 
Small plants more skill upgrading than large 
plants, Union shops less skill upgrading 
(programming assigned to specialists) than 
non-union, history of skilled workers led to 
greater skill upgrading, scientific management 
philosophy led to skill downgrading whereas a 
participative management approach led to 
skill upgrading. 
Site 1 FMS = supervisor manages poorly 
leading to more mechanistic organization, less 
flexible Workgroup, and production problems. 
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Study Contingency variable Findings 
Adler (1991) 
Gerwin and Tarondea ( 1986 ) 
Meredith and Green ( 1987 ) 
Jones and Scott (1986) 
Site 2 FMS = autonomous work teams created, 
more contact with environment, greater skill 
levels, and smoother production. 
Organization design’ Three FMS cases-Team design led to 
upgrading of skills and intrinsic motivation 
whereas “neo-traditional” organizational 
design led to downgrading. 
French versus American American auto plants-shopfloor automation 
plants-Management reduced skill levels; French auto plants-same 
Approach’ technologies increased skill levels. 
Implementation process Poor implementation strategy increased 
worker stress whereas skilful implementation 
decreased worker stress. 
Worker selection/Job American firm hired FMS workers from 
assignment outside and created an “FMS qualifier” job 
leading to a flexible, highly skilled, 
autonomous work group. British firm used 
internal workers without FMS experience and 
encouraged workers to select their own jobs, 
leading to competition for jobs and guarding of 
expertise with no net skill increase. 
“Contingency variable is some aspect of the employee’s job category or level. 
‘Contingency variable is some characteristic of the task/technology. 
‘Contingency variable is some characteristics of the organizational design or culture. 
identify five broad categories of contingency variables. The five categories of 
contingency variables are job categories of workers, technology characteristics, 
management philosophies and existing organizational designs, implementa- 
tion process, and worker selection and job assignments. The studies by Gheis- 
sari and Fiegener (1989), Liker et al. (1987) and Aronsson (1989) all focused 
on the differential impact of technology on different job categories. Kemp and 
Mueller (1987)) Johansson (1989)) and Adler (1991) suggest that character- 
istics of the tasks or technology effect whether impacts are positive or negative. 
Kelley (1986)) Martensson (1986), Adler (1991), and Gerwin and Tarondea 
(1986) all report that organization design and culture are key contingency 
variables. Meredith and Green (1987) suggest the implementation process will 
effect how workers are impacted, while Jones and Scott (1986) suggest how 
workers are selected and jobs assigned will influence outcomes, sometimes in 
unexpected ways. 
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7. Summary and discussion of findings 
To summarize our findings, we began by identifying 30 recent studies of the 
social impacts of programmable automation in manufacturing. These studies 
generally focused on shopfloor automation or CAD, relied on cross-sectional 
case studies or surveys with small numbers of plants, and rarely used tests of 
statistical significance or reported technology/business performance out- 
comes. Despite this, there was a striking amount of agreement on the average 
social impacts of PMT. 
Beginning with the studies that reported main effects only, programmable 
automation generally seemed to be identified with more organic, open organi- 
zations with enriched jobs requiring higher skill levels. On the other hand, 
individual attitudes and perceptions of the impact of technology on job secu- 
rity/mobility were generally negative. In other words, the organization might 
become more open and participative with more interesting jobs, but individuals 
who feared for their jobs and their job mobility were likely to have negative 
feelings toward PMT (Liker et al., 1987). Even individuals who were not con- 
cerned about their jobs tended to experience greater job stress with the new, 
complex technology. 
These average tendencies masked considerable variation in impacts. For 
those studies explicitly considering contingency variables, mixed results were 
often found. That is, the same technology had different effects depending on a 
whole host of factors. These factors included job categories of workers, tech- 
nology characteristics, existing organizational design and culture, implemen- 
tation process, and worker selection and job assignments. 
These findings leave us asking several questions: (1) Does looking for only 
main effects limit findings to main effects? (2) Does looking for contingencies 
create contingencies? (3) Can the same social impact measure have main ef- 
fects under some conditions and contingent effects under others, and if so does 
this itself imply contingent impacts? and (4) Is the variation in findings the 
result of the use of non-rigorous research methods evidenced in many of these 
studies? 
On the last point, it is clear that these studies were based on weak research 
designs for testing causal propositions. Most of the studies stated findings as 
though they had proven a cause-effect relationship despite the fact that they 
were typically based on cross-sectional data, generally reported retrospec- 
tively. At best these studies provide evidence of association, not causation. 
To provide an overall framework which captures the range of contingency 
variables identified in these studies, we developed Fig. 1. This systems model 
suggests that the “social impacts” of technology will vary depending on the 
state of the organization and its environment at the time ( Ti) the technology 
is introduced. The impacts depend on characteristics of the workforce (e.g., 
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Fig. 1. Contingency model of social impacts. 
rent job, attitudes toward technology, career stage, etc.) and the broader job 
and organizational context. This broader context includes the local context 
inside the firm, formal job and organizational designs and informal organiza- 
tional characteristics (e.g., power relationships, leadership skills, culture), as 
well as characteristics of the broader environment (e.g., degree of uncertainty, 
job markets, competition, etc. ). Up to this point the model is similar to Nadler 
and Tushman’s (1980) version of the open-systems model. We add to this that 
the impacts of technology depend on the change process used to implement 
the technology and associated organizational changes (from T, to Ti+ 1 ). 
Taken together, the technological and organizational changes lead to a new 
organizational state. At time T,, 1 one can take a “snapshot” of the organiza- 
tion and see certain “impacts”. However, our model goes beyond the studies 
examined in assuming that the impact of technology is time-dependent. The 
state of the organization we will see depends on when we look. For example, 
early in the transition process we may see one set of impacts, and very different 
impacts at a later stage. To further complicate the model, members of the sys- 
tem are also aware of organizational changes and depending on how they in- 
terpret these changes (e.g., as a threat or opportunity), this will effect subse- 
quent attitudes and actions. Moreover, the new organizational state now 
becomes the current context shaping future technological and organizational 
changes. Leonard-Barton and Sinha (1991) carry this dynamic view one step 
farther arguing that what really occurs is a “mutual adjustment” of technology 
and organization. They emphasize a two-way causal process in which organi- 
zations adapt to technologies but also adapt technologies to their needs. Thus, 
technologies are not an external force impacting the system, but the system 
also shapes the role and uses of the technologies as represented by the double- 
headed arrow from the change process back to task and technology attributes. 
In sum, this model argues that technological change is a dynamic socio-tech- 
nical process in which the “impacts” of technology depend on a number of 
contextual factors and will vary over time. This model seems to represent about 
the best we can say from existing literature which presents a confusing array 
of contingency variables. A major weakness of this model is that it suggests 
that everything is dependent on everything else and does little to prioritize the 
most important contingency variables that effect the influence of PMT. We 
will return to this point when we discuss future research needs. 
8. Critique of current literature 
Having gone through a rather detailed analysis of studies of social impacts 
of programmable automation in manufacturing, we found the results contra- 
dictory and of limited usefulness for management decisions. Two major rea- 
sons for this are: 
First, these studies generally focus on description rather than explanation. 
They are simply a listing of observations; thus they are not really theory. Re- 
search on job design impacts does not explain what jobs mean to people, how 
the jobs get redefined, how these redefinitions create different skill needs, and 
how different skill needs create individual reactive responses. Discussions of 
implementation as a contingency variable does not explain the dynamic pro- 
cesses involved in worker participation and which aspects of that process are 
likely to yield the greatest worker gains. Moreover, the implementation pro- 
cesses described do not consider the dynamic readoption and reinvention ac- 
tivities involved in PMT implementation, the “mutual adaptation” discussed 
by Leonard-Barton and Sinha (1991) . 
Second, these studies are too simplistic and general. They often assume that 
one key variable, such as job skills, is the critical lever. They rarely consider 
social impacts of technology as the dynamic process depicted in Fig. 1 rather 
than as a static snapshot. They conceptualize technology as a simplistic single 
independent variable, e.g., CAD and NC machines are both simply programm- 
able technologies. 
We believe the study of the impacts of programmable manufacturing tech- 
nology can neither be treated descriptively, simplistically, or generally. In- 
stead, it must be treated as part of theory-building with complex contingency 
relationships. In our view, an appropriate treatment should have five key 
features: 
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(1) PMT is similar to any major innovation in that it is likely to alter the orga- 
nization in some way. In fact, describing PMT by Rogers’ ( 1983) five attributes 
of innovations indicates that PMT as an innovation is likely to be very difficult 
to implement without major organizational adaptation: PMT is likely to be 
largely incompatible with existing systems, complex, not easily triable, results 
not often quickly observable, and of sometimes questionable relative advan- 
tage. Thus, building a theory of the impacts of technology should analyze the 
innovation itself as a phenomenon tightly interwoven with its impacts. 
(2) PMT imp ac t s relationships among variables, not just variables themselves. 
Most researchers look for impacts of technological change one-by-one on a set 
of organizational and individual characteristics, such as the skills needed, the 
job designs, the reward structure, and employee attitudes. We propose that this 
is the wrong place to look. Instead, we believe that PMT impacts the organi- 
zation because it challenges and upsets current relationships: relationships 
among structural features of the organization, relationships among people, re- 
lationships between people and their jobs, relationships between the design 
process and people’s role in that process. For example, significant work has 
attempted to assess the skill levels of workers with PMT; we believe it is not 
skill levels per se that should be the focus, but rather the relationship between 
the worker and the technology. Skill levels are simple by-products of these 
more fundamental changes, not the focus of the change itself. 
(3) No accepted typology of PMT exists. Most of the literature on the impacts 
of PMT treats PMT (or its subcomponents such as CAD or CAM ) as a unitary 
construct. The reality, of course, is that PMT is composed of a large array of 
systems, tools, product lines, between-system relationships, and production 
variances. While we can point to a broad set of characteristics which include 
programmability and use in manufacturing sites as we have done here, some 
PMT systems perform only a few computer-aided operations on a single prod- 
uct family and then the finished part is moved by a rigid transfer line to the 
next PMT system. Alternatively a PMT system may perform a series of com- 
puter-aided operations in a flexible sequence among a flexible set of other sys- 
tems on a flexible set of parts. Clearly, the latter type of PMT system is far 
more complex. Differences among PMT systems are rarely described in suffi- 
cient detail, we believe, because there is no accepted typology for PMT. The 
organizational design literature characterizes technology in ways that are too 
abstract: a number of critically different PMT systems would all fall within 
categories marked: batch, reciprocally interdependent, nonroutine, or high task 
variety. 
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(4) PMT impacts multiple organizational levels as well as alters levels of analysis. 
Traditional work design research has focused on the individual level of anal- 
ysis. When traditional technology in a traditionally managed organization is 
brought in (such as a transfer line in a mechanistic stamping plant), studying 
the impacts on individual’s attitudes and performance makes sense. When PMT 
is introduced, the changes to relationships often force an analysis of the im- 
pacts on and role of management, support functions, work units, as well as 
individuals. In addition, and perhaps more complicated, PMT often suffi- 
ciently alters the nature of the work such that subdivisions in work that were 
feasible previously (e.g., subdividing quality inspection work from part trans- 
formation work) are no longer feasible. This means that often larger groupings 
of work must be considered, with this larger grouping no longer easily corre- 
sponding to what a single individual can do. Thus, PMT often poses the chal- 
lenge of understanding the characteristics of work independent of what any 
one individual might do. Since this seems to be difficult conceptually for many 
social science researchers to understand, they often make the leap that PMT’s 
impacts on jobs can be simply construed as a change in work design from an 
individual level to a work group level. However, not all work should necessarily 
be viewed as what individuals or groups do, but rather how tasks are grouped; 
who performs the task is a critical but separate issue. Thus, the introduction 
of PMT must be understood as altering the level of analysis for characterizing 
work. 
(5) The role of systems theory must be applied, not simply recognized. Most 
researchers of PMT today appropriately reference early sociotechnical sys- 
tems theory work as well as general systems theory for providing a philosoph- 
ical orientation in which technology and social systems are viewed as comple- 
mentary and congruent, and an understanding of boundaries, resource control, 
and human involvement is key to successful organizational functioning. Un- 
fortunately, despite this recognition and referencing, most of the empirical 
studies seem content with simply recognizing and referencing their roots rather 
than clarifying and furthering the meaning and interrelationships of such va- 
gue constructs as equifmality, congruence, and complementarity. For example, 
some of the studies in our sample concluded that the ability of the organization 
to achieve positive benefits from PMT is contingent on the organizational con- 
text in which the PMT is implemented, i.e., the systems’ notion that every- 
thing is dependent on everything else. Such a conclusion adds little to our 
ability to clarify how managers need to achieve congruence, equifinality, and 
complementarity when PMT is implemented. While Corbett’s (1985) study 
might be an exception, there seems an unfortunate dearth in setting forth 
propositions that not only directly result from this system’s tradition, but im- 
prove upon it. 
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9. Implications for future research 
There are a number of gaps in the available research literature-methodo- 
logical, substantive, and theoretical. One of the most obvious implications that 
fall out of this review of recent research on the social impacts of programmable 
automation in manufacturing is that we need more methodologically rigorous 
research, particularly in some of the neglected areas. For example, more re- 
search is needed on the impacts of information and communication technolo- 
gies in manufacturing. Production hardware such as robotics or NC machines 
are more traditionally associated with manufacturing, but there is an increas- 
ing investment in shopfloor controllers, information and communication tech- 
nologies, automated scheduling systems, e-mail, various kinds of database sys- 
tems, and shopfloor artificial intelligence (AI) systems. More research is also 
needed on the impacts of technology across organizational boundaries. As we 
move toward attempts to electronically link manufacturers with their suppliers 
and customers through CAD-to-CAD transfer of designs, computer networks, 
shared databases, and even fax machines, one would expect changes in the 
nature of communication across boundaries. Changes in reward systems that 
are appropriate for PMT and accompanying organization and job design 
changes need to be investigated. Research studies should also measure tech- 
nological performance and business outcomes so that we can understand 
whether particular social impacts are related to performance. For example, are 
the resulting reductions in feelings of job security damaging to business 
performance? 
While improving on current methods and adding additional technologies 
and organizational variables to the scope of programmable manufacturing 
technology would be useful, it is an incremental change to what has already 
been done. We believe there are five fundamental challenges for researchers in 
this field: 
(1) We need characterizations of the PMT work environment that abstractly (but 
not too) describe the most critical features of PMT and PMT-related work. In 
the work of the second author on a characterization of technology design de- 
cisions for manufacturing, a several-hundred variable classification scheme 
was first developed; this scheme included such variables as reliability of the 
scheduling system, integration of the scheduling system with the operational 
equipment, and automaticity of the quality inspection system. This scheme, in 
fact, focused only on one class of PMT, flexible manufacturing cells. When it 
became clear that this level of technical specificity was too complex and too 
specific to one type of technology, we moved up a level to a smaller, more 
abstract set of concepts that pertain to how work is accomplished, regardless 
of the name of the technical system. As one example, the concept of reciprocal 
interdependencies among tasks, among technologies, among technologies and 
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people, and among resources has become a critical one for understanding the 
impacts of PMT on human infrastructure design decisions. When the intro- 
duction of PMT modifies any of these interdependencies (such as in the case 
of introducing an automated parts tracking system), often the impact of PMT 
on how jobs should be designed is profound. 
(2) Similarly, we need characterizations of organizational features that capture 
critical dimensions that interact with PMT. Models like Fig. 1 provide a starting 
point but suggest there is an almost limitless number of variables involved. 
Broad terms like “organic” versus “mechanistic” organizations do not capture 
the range of organizational forms that influence the impact of technologies 
and how they are adapted by the organization. We need middle-range charac- 
terizations between highly generic characterizations and highly specific char- 
acterizations of particular cases. We need ways of assessing where the organi- 
zation is prior to implementation of technology so that we can understand how 
that shapes the subsequent “impacts” of technology. 
(3) Studies of t ec h no ogies impact should perhaps more appropriately be viewed 1 
as studies of the process of technological change. The theoretical focuses of our 
set of studies may portend of a broader classification: characteristics descrip- 
tive of the current work environment (i.e., formal organizational design fea- 
tures) and characteristics descriptive of how change in that work environment 
comes about (i.e., process features). With regard to the process of change, a 
set of characteristics must also be developed to include, for example, how users 
participate, the time line for implementation, readiness to change, and degree 
of change. If the impacts of technology are time-dependent, as we suspect they 
are, researchers need to attempt to build time explicitly into their studies. We 
recognize that longitudinal investigations are not always feasible. However, in 
cross-sectional studies researchers can identify the timing of their observa- 
tions and perhaps compare the timing across sites to make statements about 
effects of the stage of implementation. 
(4) Theoretic a 1 f ormulations should focus more on PMT’s influence on interre- 
lationships among variables rather than the variables themselves. We believe 
that a focus on interrelationships amounts to a focus on congruencies or 
matches. For example, in studying the impact of PMT, matches between job 
needs and skills of individuals might be examined. In other words, we are sug- 
gesting that one not simply examine the skill, but rather the match between 
skills and job requirements. In the current work of the second author, areas of 
matches being pursued include: 
- between organizational goals and work objectives; 
- between organizational goals/work objectives and technology system design 
decisions; 
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-between human infrastructure design decisions made for each job (e.g., task 
specialization, reward system, performance measurement system, skills, dis- 
cretion, coordination, etc.); 
- between human infrastructure design decisions and technology system de- 
sign decisions; 
- between human infrastructure design decisions made across multiple levels 
of the organization; and 
- between human infrastructure design decisions and organizational goals/work 
objectives. 
(5) Research needs to be conducted on the relative importance weightings of the 
various design and process features. Advocates of organizational change tend 
to argue that the process features are far more important than the design fea- 
tures for successful organizational change, i.e., even a good organizational- 
technology design can fail to achieve its goals if implemented incorrectly and, 
inversely, even a bad (i.e., incongruent) organizational-technology design can 
achieve benefits if implemented correctly. While it is probably hard to argue 
with the proposition that bad implementation leads to poor success, it is far 
more equivocal to say that bad implementation of a good design is worse than 
good implementation of a bad design or maintaining a known bad design. More 
evidence on the relative weights of design and process features is needed so we 
arrive at a short list of critical characteristics that effect the change process. 
We believe that the complexity of the study of the social impacts of tech- 
nology justifies an eclectic set of research paradigms and strategies. This field 
can benefit from both small-sample, in-depth studies that focus on a small 
number of organizations followed intensively over time, as well as more macro- 
level studies that follow a larger number of organizations at a more abstract 
level. Cross-national research, though challenging because of the great num- 
bers of variables that distinguish nations, offers the opportunity to look at the 
impact of technology under widely varying social, cultural, and economic con- 
ditions. Even the single case study can offer insights if the researcher ap- 
proaches it with a rich theoretical perspective that considers contextual influ- 
ences, recognizes the complexities of social process, and generates novel 
hypotheses for further testing. We will have to continue to learn what we can 
from the best of studies that use a variety of research methods and take a 
variety of theoretical perspectives. 
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